Dealing with Diaspora Dissent in Different Domains
WZB “Digitalization and Society” Lecture Series
April 3, 2023
Areas of Inquiry: State Strategies, Diaspora Dissent, Foreign Social Media
❓ Why do diasporas pose a unique threat to governments engaging in repression?
❓ What resources are available for states to control social media activity?
❓ How do states address diaspora dissent on foreign social media?
How do we address these questions empirically?
📊 Data and measurement
⚠️ Limitations and ethical considerations
What is so threatening about dissent in diasporas?
“Horizontal” networks at home 🏡
(Brinkerhoff 2009; Alonso and Oiarzabal 2010; Bernal 2020)
“Vertical” networks abroad 🌏
(Keck and Sikkink 1999; Michaelsen 2018; Esberg and Siegel 2020)
➡️ Diaspora dissidents can credibly ruin a state’s international reputation.
Why would states be incentivized to limit diaspora dissent?
Regime survival (Wright and Oñate Zúniga 2007; Holbig 2011; Esberg 2021)
External image management (Krcmaric 2019; Dukalskis 2021)
🔎📕 Transnational repression: Tools/tactics to intimidate and silence diaspora dissent
What do we know? Where are the research gaps?
At Home 🏡
Abroad 🌍
Domestic Platforms
Direct control over platform policies (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013; Stockmann 2013)
States + proxies disrupt information flows (King, Pan, and Roberts 2017; Roberts 2018)
State agents contact/surveil regime threats (Dalmasso et al. 2018; Schenkkan and Linzer 2021)
Coercion-by-proxy of family/friends at home (Adamson and Tsourapas 2020; Moss, Michaelsen, and Kennedy 2022)
Foreign Platforms
State-aligned trolling/harassment (Nyst and Monaco 2018; Posetti et al. 2021)
Content blocking and platform use restrictions (Pan 2017)
State + proxies frame repressive actions
Targeted disinformation and threats
➡️ No provision over “image management”
Which diaspora dissidents are targeted?
Who is behind the keyboard?
Resources
snscrape, twintLimitations
Ethical considerations
❓ Why do diasporas pose a unique threat to governments engaging in repression?
➡️ Credible sources of information on state repression; connections at home and abroad
❓ What resources are available for states to control social media activity?
➡️ Variation across where social media platforms and targets are based
➡️ No direct provision over “image management” on foreign platforms
❓ How do states address diaspora dissent on foreign social media?
➡️ Prioritize exiles over other diaspora
➡️ Address more indiscriminately during times of increased international attention
📊 Data and measurement
➡️ Expert-curated data on TR, social media data, machine learning models/LLMs
⚠️ Limitations and ethical considerations
➡️ Focus on information about individuals who are already in the public eye
koh@hertie-school.org
https://allisonkoh.github.io/
@allisonwkoh@mastodon.social🎓
@allisonwkoh@fosstodon.org📊
@allisonkoh_